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Abstract 
The aim of this article is to offer some insights into the remarkable happenings that occurred 
in Cyprus during a two-week period (15 March – 28 March 2013) when the country was left 
with no banking system, subsisting solely on ATMs and cards. At the same time, we aim to 
provide some new perceptions into the role of ATMs, POSs and credit cards in critical 
economic situations where a bank run, bank insolvency, or bail-in are likely to happen. We 
adopt a „procedural approach‟ and use the sequence of events method towards building up a 
„timeline analysis‟. Our discussion suggests that for a number of reasons, the Cypriot bail-in 
case has breached the confidence of unsecured and secured depositors and investors on a 
global scale.  Also, we suggest that during the preparations of the supposedly unexpected 
bail-in, which Cypriot MPs firstly rejected and then accepted the Eurogroup and IMF 
proposal, ATMs, POSs and credit cards have played a pre-arranged role, securing a 
controlled circulation of money and transactions with restrictions.  
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Introduction 
On 15 March 2013, the Cypriot Economy was on the verge of disorderly bankruptcy. This 
day was the beginning of what afterwards was recorded as the longest shutdown of a 
country‟s banking system in history.  Grounded within a theoretical and empirical body of 
exploring the development of electronic payments; rapid advances in automation systems; 
and elements of a cashless society, this article communicates the critical situation of a 
European country with no banking system for a fortnight, and depicts a life moving on solely 
on Automated Teller Machines (ATM‟s) and Point of Sale (POS) terminals. The discussion 
also lies within a wider and accumulating body of literature on major bank failures, economic 
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crashes and organisational legitimacy that stem from The Great Depression of the 1930s. We 
adopt a „sociotropic‟ stand, towards reflecting the normative implications of the Cyprus deal 
(Suchman, 1995). Within this framework, we aim to evaluate the outputs and consequences 
as well as techniques and procedures underpinning the Cyprus case. To avoid a sprint over 
old ground, in both areas the review is selective, not exhaustive.  
 
In context, Cyprus is a small economy (0.2% of euro area GDP). The country joined the euro 
zone and introduced the euro on 1
st
 January 2008. The assessment of the European 
Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) back in 2007 found no problems with the 
Cypriot banking sector and confirmed the country‟s suitability for Eurozone membership.  
Five years later, on 15 March 2013, Cyprus was insolvent. For the record, at the end of 2007, 
the value of Cyprus pounds in circulation was around 635 million, from which £590 million 
in banknotes
1
 and £45 million in coins
2
.   To support the changeover from Cyprus Pounds to 
Euros, 79 million euro banknotes of all denominations and 395 million euro coins were 
injected into the country prior to the new year‟s day of 2008.  
 
The free movement of people and goods within the EU implies inflows and outflows of cash 
in a continuous migration flow that cannot be measured accurately. Therefore, determining 
the actual value of banknotes in circulation in each EU country is difficult. But according to 
the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBoB), at the end of 2012 the value of Euros was €778,645,730 
in banknotes and €95,109,592,79 in coins.  
 
Some interesting statistics about the Cypriot economy one day before the collapse (14 March, 
2013) are the following: The Cypriot banking system was comprised by 136 Monetary 
Financial Institutions (MFIs), including the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC), commercial 
banks, Co-operative Credit Institutions (CCIs) and electronic money institutions.
3
 Customers 
were served through 771 bank branches providing cash services island-wide
4
. The 
domestically owned credit institutions accounted for 60% of total banking system assets. 
Excluding the Central Bank of Cyprus, the sum of deposits in the Cypriot banking system as 
of February 2013 was €67,468 billion5 (Table 1); almost 8 times the country‟s annual Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of €17,887 for 20126.  On March 15, when the Cypriot banking 
system shut, half of all bank deposits were sitting with the two biggest banks, namely, Bank 
of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki).  
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Table 1 
Domestic residents Other euro area residents Residents of rest of the world 
 
Total  
Outstanding amounts (billion) 
2006 Dec. 27,400.7 1,147.8 14,550.6 43,099.0 
2007 Dec. 32,294.2 1,390.4 18,829.4 52,514.0 
2008 Dec. 39,461.8 1,090.6 15,456.8 56,009.3 
2009 Dec. 41,011.6 1,290.7 15,852.7 58,154.9 
2010 Dec. 45,379.3 4,035.3 20,525.2 69,939.7 
2011 Dec. 43,747.9 5,355.4 20,194.2 69,297.6 
2012 Dec. 43,316.8 5,322.6 21,518.0 70,157.4 
2013 Jan. 42,789.6 4,748.3 20,882.9 68,420.8 
(Table 1 - Source: Monetary and Financial Statistics, Statistics Department, Central Bank of Cyprus
7
) 
 
Also, Automated Teller Machines (ATM‟s) and Point of Sale (POS) terminals were popular 
among Cypriots as they were among international visitors. The first ATMs were introduced 
by the „Bank of Cyprus‟ in 1976, followed by the second biggest institution „Cyprus Popular 
Bank‟ in 1989.  Since then, the increase and popularity of ATMs has been substantial. As we 
present in Table 2, the total number of ATMs as of 15 March 2013 was 698, recording a 90% 
increase within a decade. Identically, the number of POS terminals in 2013 was 22,922, 
recording an 86% increase since 2003.    
 
Table 2 The Growth of POSs and ATMs in Cyprus 
Year  # of POS’s # of ATM’s 
2001 n/a 311 
2002 n/a 355 
2003 12,267 367 
2004 13,462 415 
2005 16,028 444 
2006 16,834 524 
2007 18,210 556 
2008 20,862 611 
2009 21,459 669 
2010 22,392 674 
2011 22,687 698 
2012 22,922 698 
(Source: Data kindly provided by CBoC and JCC Payment Systems Ltd, Cyprus, Nicosia) 
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Not surprisingly, digital banking services were also popular among Cypriot consumers
1
. As 
we present in Table 3, data accumulated from the four main banks in Cyprus demonstrate a 
significant growth of mobile and internet banking since their launch. 
 
The growth of Internet and Mobile Banking in Cyprus since their launch 
 
 
Bank 
Year internet 
banking was 
launched 
Increase in 
usage since 
launch 
Year Mobile 
banking was 
launched 
Increase in 
usage since 
launch 
Bank of Cyprus 2000 30% 2010 
 
June 2012         
(I-phone and 
Android apps 
were launched) 
350%  
 
250% (within 
one year) 
Cooperative 
Central Bank  
2008 500% Will soon be 
launched 
- 
Alpha Bank 2005 50% 2009 50%  
Hellenic  Bank 2002 15% 2011 1%  
Table 3: Data accumulated through telephonic interviews8  
 
The Bank of Cyprus (BOC) was the first bank which introduced internet and mobile banking 
to its customers. BOC launched both services in 2000 simultaneously, as a WAP (Wireless 
Application Protocol) service, but the use was extremely low for ten whole years. In fact, 
only 1 to 2 % of its total subscribers were using this service. This is attributable to the low 
number of mobile phones subscribed to the internet.  Also, according to BOC officials, the 
service was not user friendly to customers.  
 
However, a revised strategy on mobile and internet banking in 2010 lead to a remarkable 
growth on usage. In November 2010, the new Mobile Banking service („mobi.1bank.com‟) 
was launched to provide an enhanced and more convenient service to customers. This 
                                                             
1 A survey by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus in the first quarter of 2012, showed that almost 
30% of the 584,863 internet users in Cyprus (representing 52.2% of the population) used mobile or smart 
phones to access the internet away from home or work while 25,9% used a laptop, notebook or netbook.   
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innovation lead to an increase of 350% on usage within a year (Table 3). In June 2012, a 
complete I-phone and android application was launched. This innovation has lead to a further 
250% increase on usage until today.          
 
Internet banking usage has also increased since its launch. In 2012, there were 100,000 
„1bank‟9 subscribers at the Bank of Cyprus, recording an increase of 14% compared to 2011.  
Alpha Bank launched its mobile banking service in 2009, and has seen a 50% increase in 
usage by its customers. The Cooperative Central Bank, has had a striking 500% increase in 
its Internet banking usage since it was launched in 2008. This bank is also in the process of 
designing its own I-phone and Android mobile application in order to further enhance its 
services to its customers
10
.  
 
Our research across the four main banks in Cyprus also aimed at examining the effect of 
internet and mobile banking on the use of ATM machines. The findings revealed that even 
though the use of internet/mobile banking has increased, the use of ATM machines has not 
been affected. Specifically, the Hellenic Bank‟s Group Webmaster stated that there has not 
been a decrease in the use of ATM‟s and that mobile/internet usage actually adds value to the 
use of ATM‟s.  This is because customers still need to use ATM‟s to withdraw or deposit 
money for payments (either digital or face to face) and can do so at any time they want, 
without stepping inside the bank. Therefore both ATM‟s and mobile/internet banking serve 
the same purpose, that is, convenience and a faster service to customers. Also, the Marketing 
Manager of the Bank of Cyprus mentioned that the use of ATM‟s has not been affected 
negatively since most customers mainly use ATM‟s to withdraw cash, something which their 
1-Bank digital service cannot provide. 
 
Whilst we present these statistical findings for consideration, an account on the Cypriot 
economy could not be accurate without a reference to the island‟s tourism industry. For the 
period between January and December 2012, revenue from tourism was estimated to 1.9 
billion (exact figure: €1.927,7 million), which is 11.3% of the annual GDP.   The contribution 
of tourism to GDP, nevertheless, is significantly greater than this value, as a number of 
sectors such as transport, entertainment and retail are benefiting, making tourism the most 
important industry in Cyprus. The impact of Tourism is also reflected in the use of ATM‟s 
and POS‟s. Indicatively, we present below the value of card payments by locals and tourists, 
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where the value of tourist payments for both 2011 and 2012 is circa 20% of all payments at 
the POS‟s.  
 
 
Statistical data on card use by Cypriots and Tourists in Cyprus and abroad 
 
 
Table 4 
 
2011 
 
2012 
Payments of 
Cypriot card 
holders to 
local 
merchants 
 
 
€2,205,535,632 
(# of transactions: 29,883,678) 
 
 
€2,265,269,362 
(# of transactions: 31,620,428) 
Payments and 
Withdrawals 
of Cypriot 
card holders 
abroad 
 
€1,284,903,167 
(# of transactions: 9,404,922) 
 
 
€1,404,422,783 
(# of transactions: 10,216,335) 
 
 
Payments of 
tourists to 
local 
merchants 
 
€473,167,413 
(# of transactions: 4,221,082) 
 
 
 
€532,628,986 
(# of transactions: 4,845,492) 
 
(Source: Data kindly provided by JCC Payment Systems Ltd, Cyprus, Nicosia) 
 
 
Moreover, to show how the key events, activities, patterns and changes were unfolding over 
the critical two week period, the collection, presentation and analysis of data employs a 
„procedural approach‟11. This involved a systematic gathering of documents as sources of 
data, including acts of parliament, banks‟ official proceedings, government key 
announcements, mass media outputs
2
, organizational reports, and material collected through 
interviews and field notes. The sequence of events method was used throughout the research 
process towards building up a „timeline analysis‟. The first part of this analysis is a date by 
date order timeline, spanning from 15 March to 28 March 2013 – the period during which the 
Cypriot banking system remained shut.  The use of a timeline, as it appears in the following 
section, aims to convey key events and illustrate their unfolding sense-making. In the 
discussion, we examine the varied implications of the Cyprus episode on a number of 
                                                             
2
 According to Byman and Bell (2011) the credibility of mass media outputs is frequently an issue. To minimize 
this concern, a wide range of media was employed to verify particular events and news.  
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stakeholder groups, including central banks, retail banks, consumers, individual citizens, and 
the government.  
 
 
The Fortnight’s Timeline  
 
Friday, 15
 
March, 2013. The president of Cyprus arrives in Brussels to attend a Eurogroup 
summit on Cyprus, together with the top administration of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Eurozone‟s Finance Ministers. The 
negotiators and the Cypriot government have already agreed on a preliminary „memorandum 
of understanding‟ that includes the granting of a financial bailout estimated at €17 billion. On 
March 15, however, the conditions of the bailout are unclear to the people of Cyprus.  
 
By the first morning hours of Saturday the 16
th
, surprising and shocking news spreads 
throughout Cyprus. The island‟s residents wake up to shockingly discover that all bank 
accounts across the island have been frozen on quick freeze mode, literally while they were 
sleeping. After ten hours of late night talks and difficult negotiations in Brussels, president 
Anastasiades strikes a 10 billion bailout deal with the Eurozone members and the IMF on one 
condition - that a one-off levy of up to 10% on all savings is imposed
12
. 
 
Naturally, this is both an unexpected and shocking announcement. Fear, confusion and 
uncertainty spreads throughout the island as the residents realise that their savings will have 
to go through a levy. The president defends the decision as a “painful” step which has to be 
taken in order to avoid a catastrophic bankruptcy.  „Much more money could have been lost 
in a bankruptcy of the banking system or indeed of the country,‟13 he states to the public. 
 
The bailout levy means that
14
: 
 Depositors with under 100,000 euros deposited will have to pay 6.75% across the 
entire banking sector 
 Those with more than 100,000 in their accounts will have to pay 9.9% 
 Depositors will be compensated with the equivalent amount in shares of the two 
largest Cypriot banks 
 The levy will be a one-off measure 
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However, as the bailout levy has to be approved by parliament members before taking effect, 
the Cypriot banking system has to come to a standstill. To avoid a sharp destabilization of the 
banking sector, all banks shut their doors. For the first time in the history of the Eurozone, a 
nationwide banking system shuts with the frightening possibility to bankrupt wildly.  All 
electronic transactions and money transfers freeze, except credit cards and ATMs. The 
movement of capital in the form of cheque payments and deposits, withdrawal slips, and bank 
transfers are postponed until further notice. Premature terminations of time deposits are 
barred and compulsory reprogramming of maturing time deposits is imposed. Electronic 
banking platforms generate a fixed message for their users: „this service is temporarily 
unavailable‟. Mobile banking is also suspended. Subscribers can log in to their accounts to 
view their balances, but cannot carry out any transactions.  Astonishingly, a reserved amount 
of 6.75% is already in place on all deposits under €100.000 and a 9.9% on all deposits in 
excess of €100.000 on all accounts across the entire Cypriot banking system.  
 
Similar bank closures have been recorded in the past in the US (1933) and Argentina (2002). 
In the US case, Washington Governor Clarence Martin closed all Washington State banks 
and declared a three-day “bank holiday”, which was later extended by the newly elected 
President Roosevelt to eight days. During this period, the public did not have access to 
banking services, but had to rely on the cash that had been withdrawn prior to the shutdown. 
Drew Powers, in his article: The Banking Crisis of 1933: Seattle’s Survival during the Great 
Depression Bank Closures states: The banking system was unable to keep up with the 
panicked withdrawals that customers were making from their bank accounts, rendering 
banks incapable of providing money many customers had deposited.
15
. During the bank 
closure, Roosevelt managed to pass a new legislation – the Emergency Banking Act – which 
offered deposit insurance to savers when the banks reopened.  
 
In the case of Argentina, the reasons behind its bank closure were slightly different. The 
country declared itself bankrupt in December 2001, naturally causing widespread panic 
among its people. The collapse occurred in two phases. The first phase happened when the 
government announced it could not pay back the $93 billion it had borrowed. Consequently, 
Argentine businessmen began to withdraw their savings in pesos and exchanged them for US 
dollars, fearing that the Peso was going to depreciate further and that inflation was going to 
rise. As a result of the bank run, the government took emergency measures. All bank 
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accounts were frozen, overseas capital transfers were forbidden and cash withdrawals were 
limited, initially to $250 per month and later to $300 from accounts denominated in pesos. In 
addition, no withdrawals were allowed from accounts in US dollars, unless the owner agreed 
to convert them in pesos. Tens of thousands of desperate citizens stormed the banks, and 
many spent nights sleeping in front of the automated teller machines.
16
 
 
Malamud also states „[t]he enforcement of the new measures caused delays and problems for 
the general population... [and] massive queues at banks and ATMs’. It was in April 2002 
however, when the nation‟s banks closed for ten days. The government „had halted all 
banking and foreign exchange transactions, to stem the growing tide of money being 
withdrawn from the crippled banking system’. In fact, The Argentine banking system had lost 
10% of its deposits since the first phase of the collapse.
17
 
 
Monday, 18th March, 2013. The Central Bank of Cyprus announces that banks will remain 
closed.  March 19 and March 20 are declared bank holidays. Clearly, the banking system 
could not have opened without knowing how much the cut of the deposits would eventually 
be. The previous night, Sunday 17, the Central Bank had informed commercial banks that the 
levy percentages had changed. For deposits up to €100,000 the levy would be 3 per cent, 
between €100,000 and €500,000 10 per cent and above €500,000 12.5 per cent.18 As part of 
the agreement, an announcement by the Ministry of Finance states that shares of banking 
institutions will be recapitalized and offered to depositors
19
. 
 
  
Shortly after the announcement, long queues begin to form in front of the cash machines as 
life can only carry on through two particular means. People can sustain themselves only by 
queuing at the long lines of ATMs to withdraw cash, or stay cashless and use their credit 
cards. In spite of the banks being closed, ATMs are stocked up with cash for people wanting 
to make withdrawals. The Central Bank‟s instruction to the banks is to keep re-supplying the 
ATMs with money several times over the long weekend. The withdrawal limit at the Cyprus 
Popular bank is €800 per day and at the Hellenic Bank €1000. Apart from the economic 
necessity and for the country‟s continued existence, this could also serve as a psychological 
stimulus for citizens. 
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Within hours, most branches have no more money and have to ask for extra cash from the 
Central Bank. In an announcement issued on this day, the Association of Cyprus Banks 
spokesman said that “in cooperation with the Central Bank of Cyprus, banks are making 
every effort to ensure that the increased needs of cash among the public will be continuously 
satisfied through the ATMs” (cited in Christou, Cyprus Mail, 18/03/2013).  
 
On the same day, a number of countries issue travel advice for Cyprus, prompting their 
nationals traveling to Cyprus to take different forms of payment, such as euros, and 
credit/debit cards. „ATMs, debit and credit cards can be used as normal however, while banks 
are closed, we advise taking sufficient euros to cover the duration of your stay, alongside 
appropriate security precautions against theft‟.20 In addition, the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office Travel advise British nationals receiving pension payments in Cyprus 
bank accounts to contact the International Pension Centre. „UK forces pensioners that have 
payments made to a Cyprus bank account are currently suspended by City Bank (payments 
are via City Bank in the UK for onward payment to Cyprus). City Bank has suspended all 
payments to Cyprus accounts until the situation becomes clearer‟.21 
 
March 19. Tuesday Evening. The Cyprus House of Representatives reject the horizontal 
levy proposal, putting the whole project of austerity across Europe at risk. This comes as a 
surprise to members of the IMF and Eurogroup and some even consider the rejection risky, 
given the fact that the country is on the verge of bankruptcy and limited options are available 
to save the banks from collapsing. The negotiations are turning towards a dead end and the 
deal is in serious jeopardy.  
 
On the same day, the United Kingdom sends 1m euros (£850,000) to Cyprus as a 
"contingency measure" to provide British military personnel with emergency loans in case 
cash machines and debit cards stop working. At the same time, the British Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) begins approaching their personnel, asking if they want their March, and 
future months' wages, paid into UK bank accounts, rather than Cypriot accounts
22
. 
 
 
Thursday, 21
st
 March. Cyprus is already with no banking system for 5 days. The central 
bank announces that banks will remain closed for at least another five days. It is not clear for 
how much longer credit cards will be functioning in the country but at this time, ATMs‟ cash 
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and credit cards are the only remaining methods of transacting. The Popular Bank has limited 
cash withdrawals from ATM machines to just €260 per day. The withdrawal limit at the 
Hellenic Bank remains at €1000 per day. The Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) also 
announces that it can no longer support the Cypriot banking system. 
 
At the centre of the crisis in Nicosia, all roads leading to the House of Parliament and the 
presidential palace are blocked by police road blocks. Media reports state that the Popular 
Bank, the island‟s second biggest lender, will be closing down, which causes a rush by 
customers at ATM‟s. At the same time, hundreds of the bank‟s employees try to charge at the 
parliament resulting in small-scale scuffles with the police. While the Cypriot Financial 
Minister is in Moscow for discussions, rumours support that the employees of Popular Bank 
have received layoff letters; Cyprus Central Bank officials are in Moscow discussing possible 
alternatives; and the Central Bank formulates capital controls for the first time in the 
Eurozone. Oxymoronically, some media are still advertising Popular Bank‟s and Bank of 
Cyprus‟ saving promotional deals, with an escalating or fixed interest rate of up to 5.25%.  
 
March 22. Long queues have formed at almost every one of the bank‟s ATMs island wide. 
The reason why people rush to their nearest ATM is twofold. The first reason is a common 
feature in occasions of extreme crisis, that is, people want to withdraw as much money as 
they can fearing that the banks are insolvent and, levy or not, they will be unable to withdraw 
their deposits
23
. Furthermore, under the fear of losing their money, most retailers and traders 
begin refusing card transactions. Clearly, every card transaction directs the retailers‟ money 
into a bank account. With a bank system under the threat of bankruptcy, or levy as the best 
option, most retailers prefer to turn down customers rather than accept their cards. At this 
point, it seems that citizens have only one option left, that is, to stand in the long line of an 
ATM.  
 
But the Central Bank officials and a number of governmental representatives insist otherwise. 
Their advice is that retailers and traders should keep receiving cards as usual. At the same 
time, they deny all reports and rumours circulating in the media about the default of Popular 
Bank. Also, a legal framework is set by parliament that night, placing capital controls to 
avoid a sharp destabilization of the banking sector and the Cypriot economy as a whole.  
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In the retail sector, small shops and supermarket stores cannot restock as suppliers can only 
accept cash. The chairman of the Small Shopkeepers Union (POVEK), Stefanos Koursari 
said that it was unfair for businesses to ask for cash payments at a time when there was a 
shortage of cash. “The only way that people can get cash is via ATM machines. There is a 
chain reaction going on. We must all keep calm and not make financial gain from a crisis 
situation. We must realise the magnitude of this problem and join together” (Koursari, 
cited in Cyprus Mail, 22/03/2013).  
 
Following the extended bank closure, the British Government reissues travel advice for 
Cyprus. „The Government of Cyprus has announced an extended bank closure. ATMs, debit 
and credit cards can be used as normal however, while banks are closed, we advise taking 
sufficient euros to cover the duration of your stay, alongside appropriate security precautions 
against theft‟.24  
 
Saturday, March 23. The chairman of the Petrol Owners Association warns that petrol is 
running out. Petrol-station owners do not have cash to refill their reserves. Payment cheques 
and petrol resupplies on credit are not an option. In fact, while people without a credit card 
are running out of cash, petrol stations start demanding cash payments for fuel. Members of 
the society that do not have cards encounter problems and are left with no money.  
 
 
March 24. The Central Bank reduces the withdrawals from Popular Bank ATMs to a daily 
maximum of €100. For the Bank of Cyprus, ATMs withdrawal limit is €120. The withdrawal 
limit at the Hellenic Bank remains at €1000 per day. These limits are expected to remain until 
the banks reopen or until confirmation of the continued emergency funding from the 
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA).  
 
 
Monday, March 25. A last minute agreement is reached at the Eurogroup between Cyprus, 
the heads of the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF. The agreement is reached just 
a few hours before the expiration of an earlier ECB deadline to discontinue liquidity 
assistance to Cypriot banks via the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) facility
25
. As per 
the official agreements, the Cyprus Popular Bank automatically becomes subject to 
immediate resolution. Also: 
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 All insured deposits in all banks (i.e., deposits below €100k) remain fully protected in 
accordance with the relevant EU legislation.  
 All deposits in excess of €100K at the Cyprus Popular Bank are confiscated.   
 All deposits in excess of €100K at the Bank of Cyprus (BOC) will go through a levy 
of 37.5 percent.    
 
The deal also commits Cyprus to restructure the banking sector through the creation of the 
Cyprus Asset Management Company that will take over the bad loans from the banks from 
Greece and Cyprus.  
 
Tuesday, March 26. The banks remain closed. Customers‟ ATM receipts have stopped 
showing the actual „available balance‟. They show a „reserved balance‟ instead, and an 
available amount of no more than €100. A customer‟s receipt is shown on TV, inscribing the 
following message: 
Reserved Balance: €1320.00 
Available Balance: €100.00 
 
The Hellenic Bank maximum limit remains at €1000 per day. For the Bank of Cyprus and the 
Popular Bank the limit is €100 per day.  
 
Wednesday, March 27. Companies selling safes receive an increase in calls asking for 
information, as people prepare to stash their cash at home. According to Gregoriou (Cyprus 
Mail, 28/03/2013), people were asking about the size of safes, the cost and the level of safety 
that each type of safe provides.  
 
 
Thursday, March 28. After almost two weeks with the system running solely on cards and 
ATMs, banks across the country are ready to open their doors at 12 o‟clock (1000 hours UK 
time). Temporary capital controls are in place for the first time in the Eurozone, restricting 
cash withdrawals per person per bank per day at €300, and controlling cash outflows from the 
country. The airports‟ controls raise signs notifying that the maximum allowance is only 
14 
 
€1,000 (£845) per person per journey abroad. According to the Guardian, bags are reportedly 
being searched, too.
26
  
 
Precautionarily, 5 billion euro banknotes arrive to Cyprus from the European Central Bank 
before the opening of banks. These banknotes were stored in Bundesbank, Germany and the 
measure aims to prevent commercial banks from running out of cash.  In addition, the 
European Commission produces a written statement, supporting that the temporary 
restrictions on free capital movement in Cyprus are necessary „to prevent the significant risk 
of uncontrollable outflow of deposits which would lead to the collapse of the credit 
institutions and to the immediate risk of complete destabilisation of the financial system of 
Cyprus‟.27 
 
On the whole, Cyprus has made a negative mark in history, being the first country in the 
world to have its banking system shut down for the longest number of consecutive days (13 
days: March 16
th
-28
th
), beating Argentina (10 days: April 20-29th, 2002) and the U.S  (8 
days: March 6-13th, 1933). There is a major striking similarity between each country‟s bank 
closures, that is, to prevent a bank run on deposits during a financial crisis period.  
In all cases, people faced a shortage of banknotes and coins. Argentina, for instance, suffered 
such a shortage of banknotes that the government and some businesses decided to use self-
issued bond and coupons to make up for the scarce currency
28
. Similarly in Cyprus, coins 
became scarce, salaries and rents could not be paid, people could not buy newspapers, taxi 
drivers were setting fares in five and ten-euro denominations to avoid having to use coins
29
, 
pharmacy stores were close to facing a shortage of supplies and some businesses postponed 
their operation until the banks opened. 
 Of great importance is that many savers in Argentina managed to win court cases against the 
government for imposing restrictions on withdrawals. In Cyprus, local and foreign savers and 
investors who have lost their deposits and bonds are currently in the process of filing lawsuits 
against the Cypriot government and Central Bank of Cyprus.
30
 The question is, will they be 
equally successful?  
 
Discussion 
 
15 
 
We believe that the restructuring of the Cypriot banking sector would contribute to its long-
term stability, regulation, supervision and restore its transparency. However, due to the levy, 
the case of the Cyprus Bailout is a striking and controversial phenomenon that influenced 
several stakeholder groups both in Cyprus and the peripheral euro area. But as several 
commentators were quick to point out, this is not a new „policy doctrine‟ and Cyprus is just a 
special case. We believe too that Cyprus is a special case for two main reasons. First, the 
involvement of depositors in deleveraging indebted banks depends on a variety of financial, 
political and legal forces. For instance, the very large share of foreign depositors in Cypriot 
banks; in combination with banks‟ exposure towards Greece (estimated at around €25 
billion
31
); and a number of euro-wide political implications (such as the opposition of 
German Social Democratic Party; Greens; and German government coalition parties in 
lending funds to Cyprus) have made the Cypriot levy an option.  
 
Second, the small size of the Cypriot economy, which is the third smallest in the euro area 
(0.2% of euro area GDP), was unlikely to cause systemic repercussions for the rest of the 
Eurozone. Evidently, the markets behaved as though this crisis is a uniquely Cypriot micro 
failure.
32
 It is therefore debatable whether a similar bail-in approach could be attempted for a 
large economy, such as Spain‟s.  
 
Following this line of argument, although the concerns about the health of other fragile 
economies in the rest of Eurozone are increasing (Slovenia and Spain seen as next most 
likely
33
), the case of Cyprus does not necessarily constitute a bail-in template on a Euro-wide 
scale. However, as we explain below, it does constitute an uncomfortable precedent, leading 
to another crisis of confidence, trust and organisational legitimacy.    
 
 
Crisis of legitimacy, confidence and trust 
 
Taken overall, we also believe that the Cyprus deal has brought the European banking crisis 
to a new level.
34
 To begin with, it is now proved that the fiscal austerity across Europe may 
hold a very aggressive stance. Prior confirming statements by European political leaders, 
European Commission officials and central bankers stating that, after the unique and 
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exceptional case of Greece, there would not be any further private sector involvement and 
that unsecured bank creditors would be safe have collapsed overnight.
35
   
 
Most importantly, however, the Cypriot case is a lesson about how particular institutional 
stakeholders, such as central bankers, the Eurogroup, and IMF, should behave or manage a 
subsequent crisis. Simple lessons of crisis management and competence, we would say.  Let 
us put it this way, how easy is it for investors, creditors and depositors to forget the first 
agreement (dated 16 March 2013) between the Cypriot President, the Eurogroup and the 
IMF, voiding the European Union's previous guarantee on deposits up to €100,000? The 
fragile confidence and trust in the banking system that bankers and policymakers worked 
hard to cultivate immediately after the colossal collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 has 
given its place to nervousness. The widely maintained hypothesis of protected deposits has 
officially failed through a celebrating institutional weakness, sidelining the largest 
stakeholder group, namely, retail-bank customers.  Intuitively, one would expect that 
Europeans, and primarily the depositors in other peripheral Euro countries like Spain, Greece 
and Italy, have lost their trust in banks, which begs the question: „will depositors pre-
cautiously withdraw their money?‟ Will Cyprus become a slippery slope? 
 
What is more, during and after the negotiations, the EU‟s inconsistent rhetoric, contradictory 
arguments and lack of transparency prevailed, disregarding and downplaying the wider 
financial interests and social context. For example, while the events were unfolding Jeroen 
Dijsselbloemto, the Dutch head of the Eurogroup of finance ministers, suggested that the 
Cyprus deal may serve as a template for future rescues. After hours of falling share prices, he 
retracted, stating that „Cyprus is a specific case with exceptional challenges‟36. Then, on 
March 26
th
, ECB Executive Board member Benoit Coeure insisted that Cyprus is a unique 
case and the rescue plan used should not be seen as a model for other troubled European 
countries
37
.  A few days later, on March 31
st
, the German Finance Minister Wolfgang 
Schaeuble stated that savings accounts in the euro zone were safe, adding that Cyprus was 
indeed a special case
38
. A month later, April 23
rd, 
the Cypriot president told EU 
parliamentarians that despite assurances that Cyprus was a special case, imposing levies on 
bank's depositors may be used in other countries as well
39
. How oxymoronic is this? On the 
one hand, business schools and professional bodies advocate how instability, inconsistency, 
insecurity, uncertainty and risk pose immediate threats to capitalism‟s free market economy, 
and on the other hand, top level institutionalised efforts undermine the economy‟s 
17 
 
foundations. With this, of course, we do not make a claim of what is best for the world of 
money and finance, or how things should be done. On the contrary, this kind of ambiguity 
creates more suspicions about the credibility and viability of a free market, its policy makers 
and institutions.   
 
Furthermore, with the final levy agreement (dated 25/03/2013) insured depositors will not 
face losses. However, once again the deal undermines financial stability.  With this 
agreement, the two largest Cypriot banks defaulted over their bonds; uninsured depositors 
suffered big losses; stockholders were cleaned out; and bondholders were bailed in. It 
constitutes a precedent of an alarming change in the rules of market finance. Ironically, it was 
one such bail-in (the restructuring of Greek government debt) that led to the problems faced 
by the Cypriot banks, which were big holders of Greek bonds.
40
  
 
Other than legislative quietism, this kind of behaviour and actions raise issues of legitimacy. 
„Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions‟ (Suchman 1995, p. 574). In this case, legitimacy is the public 
perception or assumption about the actions of the IMF, ECB, the Eurozone‟s Finance 
Ministers and Cyprus government. In addition, legitimacy concerns both how people act 
towards institutional actions and how they understand them (Suchmam, 1995). While a 
legitimate system may be considered by people as somehow trustworthy, meaningful, 
predictable, and credible, entities without an acceptable legitimate character „are more 
vulnerable to claims that they are negligent, irrational, or unnecessary‟ (Meyer and Rowan, 
1991:50). With regard to the Cyprus case, although we agree with the restructuring of the 
banking system towards transparency, supervision and safeguarding of stakeholder groups, it 
seems that EU officials were not ready for such endeavours. Their actions were hasty and 
inconsistent. Also, they showed disregard to major stakeholder groups, as banks‟ 
shareholders and depositors were not invited to participate in decision making. In fact, the 
deal was discussed and a decision was taken in absentia. 
 
A levy, nevertheless, causes so much panic that it can hardly stand on its own. It needs 
supporting mechanisms of capital control. At the time of writing these lines, three months 
after the deal, a genuine loosening of restrictions over depositors‟ accounts is still in-waiting. 
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As we explain below, previous cases indicate towards long periods of restrictions and capital 
controls.   
 
 
Uncertainty over capital controls 
 
By examining the depositors‟ stake in more depth, it puts a lot about the Cyprus deal into 
perspective. Three months after the agreement, restrictions and capital controls are still in 
place. To fully understand the nature of restrictions, let us present the following example.   
If an individual or legal person had the amount of one million Euros deposited in the Bank of 
Cyprus (BOC) prior 15 March, 2013, out of this amount:  
 
 37.5% has been levied and converted into shares; 
 22.5% is „frozen‟ and possibly part or the whole of it, will be converted into shares (in 
other words, the final levy percentage is still undecided); 
 The remaining 40% of the amount is „frozen‟ for liquidity purposes; 
 All money in time deposits are barred and have an automated compulsory 
reprogramming imposed by the Central Bank; 
(Source: Central Bank of Cyprus
41
) 
 
In fact, three months after the deal, it remains unknown „whether the final levy will be 37.5, 
60, 70, 80 or 90 percent‟42. This condition, however, is not that disappointing if we consider 
that an individual or legal person with a one million deposit in the second bank, namely, 
Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki) is now left with 100K as all deposits in excess of €100K have 
been confiscated.  
 
Among others, the long list of restrictions include measures on transfers, use of credit and 
debit cards, use of cheques, cash withdrawals, and access to deposits. At this point, it is worth 
comparing Cyprus to the case of Iceland. In 2008, three of Iceland‟s major banks collapsed, 
and $85 billion, some of which was owned by Dutch and British investors, were lost as a 
result. After a public referendum, the government declared that it would only safeguard 
domestic bank account holders and even refused to compensate retail depositors in foreign 
subsidiaries of Iceland‟s banks. Only a number of British investors managed to withdraw 
£95.5m from their internet-based accounts in Kaupthing bank before it collapsed
43
. No long 
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queues outside ATM‟s occurred, as the local people felt that their money was secure after the 
referendum vote.  
 
But of great interest to us, is the time span of Iceland‟s capital controls. These controls were 
supposed to last a few weeks or, at worst, a month or two, but half a decade later, the capital 
controls are still in place, getting increasingly restrictive. The capital controls in Cyprus are 
also meant to be temporary. Will they be temporary? Our aim is not to speculate on the length 
of restrictions but, under the circumstances, it seems that some of these measures will not be 
abolished easily.
44
 
 
 
ATMs and POSs: a means to an end? 
 
The Cyprus case has another dimension, one that lies within the framework of automation 
and cashless society. The complete picture assigns to ATMs, POS‟s, and credit cards a new 
role. While the European leaders were consulting each other throughout the critical two-week 
period, ATMs and cards were undertaking a pre-arranged job, securing a somewhat stable 
pace of life on the island. While the banking system was down and electronic transactions 
blocked, ATMs were programmed to issue standard, and by all means controlled, flow of 
cash.  
 
Frankly, we do not posses any evidence stating that the levy was known or pre-arranged by 
the Cypriot government in advance. Despite the lack of concrete details, between the 1
st
 and 
15
th
 March, six thousand individuals and legal persons transferred out of the country 
significantly unusual amounts of money. More specifically, just days before the hiatus of 
Cypriot banks on 15 March, one and a half billion euro; one and a half billion Dollars; 37.4 
million pounds sterling and almost 11 billion Rubles were transferred abroad. A list with the 
6000 large depositors was submitted to the parliamentary ethics committee by the Central 
Bank and then leaked to the public. Notably, politicians, senior bank officials and companies 
were among those who benefited from preferential information
45
. We do not support that the 
levy was pre-determined. But, if the levy deal was planned in advance, then the function of 
ATM‟s and POS‟s terminals during the fortnight was mainly a mean to an end. Overall, the 
bundle of restrictions, in combination with the use of ATMs and POSs, gave government 
more control as they would be able to track virtually all transactions.  
20 
 
 
Furthermore, the POSs terminals‟ role was jeopardized when many retailers and traders 
began refusing cards. As we discussed earlier in the timeline, there was considerable doubt 
amongst Cypriot retailers and traders as to whether they should accept card payments or not. 
The government‟s immediate intervention, however, in some way restored card transactions. 
Oxymoronically, at the same time as the central bank and the government were insisting that 
receiving payments at POSs is risk-free, retailers‟ revenues were drifting into accounts that 
got levied a few hours later.   
 
 
Statistical data on card use by Cypriots and Tourists in Cyprus and abroad 
 
Table 5 February 2013 March 2013 
Payments of 
Cypriot card 
holders to local 
merchants  
 
€176,697,814 
(# of transactions: 2,496,161) 
 
€140,848,438 
(# of transactions: 2,262,868)   
Payments and 
Withdrawals of 
Cypriot card 
holders abroad 
 
€107,073,978 
(# of transactions: 853,783) 
 
€142,634,098 
(# of transactions: 860,774) 
 
Payments of 
tourists to local 
merchants 
 
€21,429,235 
(# of transactions: 223,908) 
 
 
€27,689,827 
(# of transactions: 270,503) 
(Source: Data kindly provided by JCC Payment Systems Ltd, Cyprus, Nicosia) 
 
Our findings (Table 2) point towards an increase in the number of transactions between 
February and March 2013. The card payments by Cypriots dropped by almost €36 million, 
reflecting the uncertainty in the market. This is also attributed to the restrictions imposed by 
the central bank. Appendix A shows the use of cards in March 2013 by sector. The payments 
and withdrawals abroad increased considerably, as the branches of Cypriot banks abroad 
were not affected by the deal or restrictions during or after the negotiations. Also, the 
payments by tourists to local merchants recorded an increase by €6,260,592. The increase in 
spending, however, is attributable to the increase of tourist arrivals. Specifically, the number 
of tourist arrivals in February was 42.327
46
, while the tourist arrivals in March were 92,620
47
.  
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But what are the likely consequences of the crisis of trust and capital restrictions? What are 
the lessons taught from similar cases like Greece? Many would point towards a series of 
micro and macro implications, such as an increase of stakeholders trying to compensate their 
income losses through additional shadow economy activities; tax evasion, barter; further 
shrinking of the GDP, higher levels of national dept and a dramatic slowdown of economic 
growth
48
.    
 
 
A cashless micro-economy within the macro-system 
Taking the lack of trust and confidence into account, not unrelated is the possible emergence 
of a so called informal, dual, grey, hidden, or black economy. An ever increasing literature 
that began in the 1950s (among many others: Kaldor, 1956; Cagan, 1958; Guttman, 1977; 
Feige, 1979; Smith, 1981; Frey and Weck-Hanneman, 1984; Bhattacharyya, 1990; Tanzi, 
1999; Aidt, 2003; Lyssiotou et al, 2004, Georgiou, 2007), explores legitimate concerns and 
consequences of parallel payment activities, most of which are hidden, undeclared, 
unreported and unrecorded. Often, the black economy concerns illegal activities, such as 
money laundering, trafficking and smuggling. In other cases, this activity is hardly illegal, 
such as undeclared work that is defined differently in national legislation, or barter, which is 
an old traditional system of exchanging goods or services for goods or services without using 
a monetary medium.  
 
Some studies indicate that informal economy causes the governments of the European Union 
member states about €1 trillion a year49. Other studies rocket the number to 2.2 trillion50.  The 
results vary because the estimation of shadow economy depends a lot on the dataset included 
in the calculations, as well as the methodology used. But informal economy is not comprised 
only by legal market activities that are deliberately kept hidden for reasons such as tax 
evasion. For example, tax evasion and avoidance in Cyprus is estimated between 8% and 
10% of the annual GDP
51
. However, non-market economic activities, such as home 
production; undeclared work; barter; or the solicitation of money and food by poor people 
accounts for about two-thirds of the shadow economy.  When a more holistic approach is 
taken, the size of the shadow economy in Cyprus the last five years, 2008 - 2012, is estimated 
between 26% and 28% of GDP (Table 3 and Appendix B). On average, European shadow 
economies (in many variants) are between 18.4% and 22.1% of total economic activity. 
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Already in Cyprus, in an effort to ease the effects of the financial crisis, a number of 
municipalities have joined together to launch a web-based barter scheme for individuals
52
. 
The barter program aims to offer a range of goods and services such as electronic goods, 
professional advice, private tuition lessons and gardening. It aims to be part of a cashless 
transaction system, which uses a digital form of currency instead of money. Members who 
register will be awarded with 300 points, which can immediately be exchanged for the goods 
and services posted on the website. However, it will be up to each member to decide on how 
many points their products or services will be advertised or exchanged, and the organisers 
hope that an element of trust, honesty and enthusiasm will be established among the barter 
members. If the barter scheme becomes popular, informal economy will become bigger; tax 
evasion and avoidance will rise; and the GDP will shrink even further. Illegal or not, barter 
affects the economic system. Fundamentally barter is a one-to-one activity. But when 
millions are bartering in an organised mode, it becomes a parallel micro-economy, 
complementing and altering the macro-system
53
. 
 
For instance, evidence from Greece, a country with heavy financial burdens since 2009, show 
that barter is becoming increasingly popular. Goods and services vary from home-made jam 
Table 5: "Size and development of the Shadow Economy from 2003 to2012. Source: Schneider (2011)  
Table 6: Size of the Shadow Economy of 31 European countries in 2012, 0f GDP 
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to Yoga lessons, from electrical appliances to clothes
54
. Barter networks exist face-to-face 
and online. Likewise, we believe that the Cyprus post-levy era provides a fertile ground for 
this kind of activity. Limited liquidity, higher tax rates, restrictions on money circulation, rise 
in unemployment, escalating poverty
55
, and the current attitude of public towards the state, 
are all factors contributing to the development of informal economy and a growing scope for 
non-traditional banking. Besides, it is widely accepted that the situation of each country‟s 
official economy plays a crucial role in people‟s decision to work in the shadow economy56. 
 
 
The virtual dimension of non-traditional banking  
Virtual, digital, or electronic currency, among its many names, offers an alternative economy.  
An interesting example of non-traditional banking is the „Bitcoin‟, which operates outside the 
central bank regulatory framework. The Bitcoin is a decentralised digital form of currency 
which relies on an internet based peer to peer network. Bitcoins can be used to buy goods and 
services online, and are stored in electronic wallets with unique computerised codes. A 
consumer can transact in Bitcoins even with a mobile phone application.  It may also be a 
potentially attractive currency in which to settle international transactions, without the usual 
bank charges or exchange rates
57
. 
 
Since the banking crisis in Cyprus, the demand for digital currencies such as Bitcoin is 
believed to have increased. In January 2013, one Bitcoin was worth $20. By March 2013 it 
soared up to $250. For many, it is the Cyprus crisis and the wider lack of confidence that has 
helped the Bitcoin gain popularity.
58
  
 
During the bank closure, rumours also spread that the first Bitcoin ATM machine would soon 
open in Cyprus. Bitcoin entrepreneurs found the opportunity to announce that they planned to 
launch the first Bitcoin ATM machine in Cyprus as a „humanitarian effort against the 
oppression of the governments and central banks’. Its founder Jeff Berwick stated: We 
looked around the world and just decided Cyprus made a lot of sense since the banking 
system has been all but shut down for the last two weeks.  We now have orders for 300+ 
machines in 30+ countries and are moving quickly to handle the demand.
59
 However, since 
ATM machines were operating in Cyprus during the shutdown, „Bitcoin ATM‟ decided to 
launch their first ATM machine in Los Angeles, where they operate. Of course, their reason 
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for referring to Cyprus is not questionable. Cyprus gained a huge amount of media attention 
during the fortnight and it was a perfect opportunity for the Bitcoin ATM founders to 
promote their virtual currency. In any case, Bitcoin currency is popular among investors and 
depositors that are worried about the safety of traditional banking and paper currency.
60
 To be 
frank, we do not know if the happenings in Cyprus increased Bitcoin‟s popularity but, the 
Cyprus episode has added to the pool of concerns, prompting a retreat from the traditional 
banking system.   
 
There is also a high degree of scepticism around its credibility. Firstly, the Bitcoin is not a 
tangible currency like paper money, but more like voucher codes that can be stored on the 
internet. Even though the Bitcoin ATM will give users the chance to exchange Bitcoins with 
paper cash, some people may feel reluctant to move away from the traditional banking 
system as they find it difficult to comprehend how its complex system works. Secondly, the 
value of a Bitcoin fluctuates erratically. As we mentioned earlier, the value of a Bitcoin has 
increased from $20 up to $250 and then dropped down to $130 within six months. Its 
instability in value raises many questions about its viability. 
 
Thirdly, at present Bitcoin is not accepted by governments or banks, something which is a 
cause for concern. In fact the FBI released a report last year that the Bitcoin can easily be 
used to launder money or engage in criminal activities due to its decentralised nature. 
Nevertheless, regulators have already started to take virtual currencies more seriously and are 
in the process of applying money-laundering rules. Lastly, a “Bitcoin wallet” is also 
susceptible to being hacked. Last year, the reputation of Bitcoin was damaged when 24,000 
Bitcoins were stolen, worth $US 250,000.
61
   
 
Yet, now that the news on its existence has spread further, does the Bitcoin, or any other 
virtual currency have the potential to replace cash? With all its flaws, can it become the 
global currency of the future? Would the Cypriot people, who are still trying to overcome the 
bail-in shock, be willing to throw their money into the vast world of cyberspace, with no 
protection guaranteed if and when something goes wrong with the Bitcoin? 
 
To conclude, it would make more sense to wait and see if the Bitcoin will sustain itself in the 
global economy before opting to transact with any type of virtual currency. On the other 
hand, are investors and depositors willing to wait? Will the Cyprus levy be the last in 
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Europe? Is Cyprus a special case? Well, if the answer is no, it is good to remember that in a 
similar scenario, history is expected to repeat itself in the following way: electronic wire 
transfers; electronic payments (such as online bill payment services); mobile payments; 
automated payments (such as direct debits and standing orders); and payment cheques will 
freeze. With their widely known costs, advantages and drawbacks, credit cards and ATMs are 
expected to become central in daily life but with cashless restrictions in place. Queues will 
begin to form in front of the cash machines and, uncertainty will sky-rocket once again, 
contributing towards building up the popularity of non traditional banking, informal economy 
and virtual currencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Cards use in Cyprus by sector as of March 201362 
 
 
Merchant Category Group Report - Cards used in Cyprus 
Reporting Month: Mar 2013 
 Monthly Transactions Monthly Turnover YTD Transactions YTD Turnover 
Airlines 0.10% 0.65% 0.10% 0.55% 
Car Rentals 0.35% 0.84% 0.22% 0.49% 
Hotels 1.33% 5.13% 0.93% 3.25% 
Local Transportation 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Travel Agents 0.28% 1.72% 0.25% 1.34% 
Utilities 4.63% 6.62% 4.58% 6.29% 
Motoring - Dealers, 
Accessories and Services 
0.47% 1.64% 0.47% 1.46% 
Do-It-Yourself & Household 
stores 
3.76% 5.10% 3.73% 4.66% 
Duty free stores 0.87% 1.07% 0.70% 0.78% 
Department stores 3.59% 2.81% 3.84% 2.67% 
Supermarkets 34.41% 24.36% 30.32% 19.47% 
Other food and drink shops 
and bakeries 
5.56% 1.68% 4.83% 1.32% 
Petrol 12.12% 9.50% 11.18% 8.32% 
Clothing, Shoes and 
Accessories stores 
7.51% 7.19% 9.99% 8.49% 
Furniture stores 0.23% 1.08% 0.28% 0.97% 
Household appliance stores 0.00% 0.03% 0.01% 0.01% 
Electronics, Computers, 
Peripherals and Music 
stores 
0.95% 1.56% 1.02% 1.51% 
Restaurants, Bars and 
Catering 
5.17% 4.28% 4.64% 3.58% 
Fast food restaurants 0.18% 0.05% 0.17% 0.05% 
Pharmacies and drug stores 4.64% 3.00% 4.51% 2.64% 
Books and stationery 0.64% 0.32% 0.71% 0.34% 
Jewelry 0.29% 1.14% 0.32% 0.85% 
Gift, Souvenirs and Toy 
shops 
2.95% 2.14% 2.66% 1.84% 
Direct marketing and 
catalogue sales (Mail Order, 
Telephone Order) 
0.33% 0.90% 0.33% 0.73% 
Kiosks & Newsagents 1.39% 0.39% 1.30% 0.33% 
Insurance 0.38% 1.73% 0.42% 1.62% 
Beauty, Barber and 
Personal Care shops 
1.57% 1.46% 1.46% 1.22% 
Professional services 0.18% 0.76% 0.17% 0.48% 
Betting, Track, Casino 
establishments 
0.09% 0.10% 0.08% 0.08% 
Health 1.38% 3.09% 1.32% 2.73% 
Schools and colleges 0.14% 1.03% 0.14% 1.01% 
Charitable organisations 0.01% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 
Membership organisations 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 
Government 2.85% 6.60% 7.83% 19.48% 
Parking 0.36% 0.43% 0.41% 0.41% 
Entertainment 0.36% 0.43% 0.41% 0.41% 
Others 1.24% 1.56% 1.04% 0.97% 
TOTAL 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
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